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*E.I.P.R. 167 In the past years the subject of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has acquired more
and more importance and has become a fundamental topic in debates about globalisation and
economic development. As is known, the primary justification for the establishment of IPRs is
economic. By offering a temporary monopoly for the commercial exploitation of an innovation, IPRs
tend to provide an incentive for creative endeavours by inventors and authors.
Increased interest has been given in the past few years to strengthening IPRs in crop breeding. The
number of countries that grant IPRs is growing, the types of inventions that can be protected are
expanding, and the scope of protection offered by IPRs systems in different countries has also
broadened. The relevance of IPRs for plant breeding and the seed industry is being further enhanced
by the development of plant biotechnology, which engendered patents for genes, tools and processes
that are increasingly common part of modern plant breeding.1
The use of IPRs in plant breeding--especially in developing and least developed countries--raises a
number of important issues, including food security and biodiversity conservation, smallholders'
access to technology, the possible monopolisation of genetic resources, the relevance and
admissibility of follow-on research, the growth of the domestic private seed sector and the status of
farmer-developed varieties. Moreover, the development of new plant varieties has always relied to
some extent on public research, partly in response to the traditional public good nature of crop
germoplasm, and it is believed that the application of IPRs to the products of a publicly funded
endeavour might be problematic.2
It is therefore worthwhile to write a few words on the two main international treaties related to IPRs in
crop breeding, i.e. the Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention)3
and the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).4 Both treaties have played and are playing a major role in
increasing worldwide the level of intellectual property protection in plant breeding.
The UPOV Convention
The UPOV Convention requires that each member country must adopt national legislation to give
plant varieties legal protection. That means that whoever creates a new plant variety (i.e. the breeder)
must be given an adequate legal protection, such protection consisting of the possibility for the
breeder to prevent others from commercially exploiting the new variety.
By providing plant variety protection (PVP), the UPOV Convention should aim to encourage the
development of new varieties of plants, for the benefit of society at large. In particular, this treaty
should contribute to the well-being of the population by contributing most particularly to (1) food
security and availability (by the increase in quantity, quality and diversity of foodstuffs); (2) sustainable
agriculture (for example, by a more efficient use of available resources and inputs or by the use of
pest and disease resistant varieties); and (3) protection of the environment and biodiversity (for
example, by reducing pressure on natural ecosystems through better productivity of cultivated lands,
and increase in species diversity).5
This article will now examine the most important provisions of the UPOV Convention in order to (try
to) verify whether the above-mentioned targets are being met by adopting UPOV-like systems.
A plant variety is protectable under the UPOV system if it is distinct, uniform and stable (so-called
DUS criteria). In particular, “uniformity” and “stability” are very relevant requirements. First of all, a
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protectable variety must be sufficiently uniform in its essential characteristics. Moreover, the stability
requirement is a temporal one, requiring the breeder to show that the essential characteristics of its
variety are homogeneous over time, even after repeated reproduction or propagation. The author
notes, therefore, that uniformity and stability are the two factors which make PVP biased towards
plant breeding for industrial agriculture.
However, the above requirements have been criticised by commentators as discouraging variability in
plant varieties that are often useful for sound agricultural *E.I.P.R. 168 practices, and as denying
protection to breeders of cultivated landraces that exhibit diversity traits and are adapted to the needs
of local farmers.6 Some scholars and non-governmental organisations, therefore, fear that the UPOV
system--contrary to its stated purposes--is capable of reducing plant genetic diversity by rewarding
breeders of uniform plant varieties, which can represent a shift towards non-sustainable monoculture
systems.
Moreover, some do not agree that UPOV-like systems orient plant breeding towards food security.
For example, in Zimbabwe more than 70 per cent of all PVP applications filed as of 1999 were on
industrial or “cash” crops, such as ornamentals, fibres, oilseed and tobacco, and only 30 per cent
covered what can be classified as food crops.7 In Kenya, by May 1999, of the 140 PVP applications
approved, only one was on a food crop: more than 90 per cent of the PVP certificates were for
flowers, while the rest went to coffee, sugarcane and barley for the beer industry.8
Furthermore, as is known, the 1991 and last version of the UPOV Convention strengthened the rights
of breeders (as compared to the earliest versions of 1961 and 1978), bringing about major changes in
PVP: such an evolution has been curiously labelled as a case of “legislative Darwinism”.9
In particular, unlike the 1978 version, the 1991 treaty expressly states that PVP must be extended to
plant varieties which are (1) merely discovered and then developed by the breeder (and not only
created); (2) essentially derived from protected varieties; (3) moreover, the 1991 version strongly
limits the so-called “farmers' privilege”.
Mere discovery
This first issue is very important. In other words, the last version of the UPOV Convention rewards
and protects activities merely consisting of discovering and further developing varieties already
existing in nature.
The author fears that this provision (and in particular the term “developing”) might be interpreted by
plant variety offices and legislators as meaning that the relevant protection is granted without
requiring breeders who discover new varieties to carry out a particularly “creative” action (such as
hybridisation or selective propagation).10 In the author's opinion such an interpretation would not be
consistent with the basic principle governing intellectual property systems, according to which--as
mentioned earlier--IPRs tend to provide an incentive for “creative” endeavours by inventors and
authors. The author fears that countries (especially the biodiversity-rich ones)--whose national
legislator or plant variety office interpret the provision at issue in such a way--are exposed to a major
risk, i.e. the progressive monopolisation of plants which are already existing in nature and known and
thus should belong in the public domain (as is stated by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity of
1992).11
Derived from protected varieties
The second issue is also important. UPOV ‘91 extends the breeder's exclusive ownership rights to
essentially derived varieties (which was not provided in the 1961 and 1978 versions). On the one
hand, the drafters of the 1991 version said that this provision was necessary to prevent a second
generation of breeders from making merely “cosmetic” changes to existing varieties in order to claim
protection for a new variety. On the other hand, some commentators have pointed out that--by
preventing second generation of breeders from developing new plant varieties which are essentially
derived from protected ones--the UPOV system is liable to stifle research activities in the agricultural
sector. This appears to be particularly true if we think that ongoing progress in crop breeding often
depends on the possibility of accessing existing genetic resources and further developing the same:
as has been pointed out, “a new plant variety cannot be created from scratch”.12
Limitation of the farmers' privilege
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The 1991 version of the UPOV Convention, moreover, strongly limits the “farmers' privilege”. The
farmers' privilege is the right of farmers who have purchased a seed of a protected variety to save
seeds from the resulting harvest for planting in the subsequent season; moreover, under some
legislations, farmers' privilege includes the right, not only to replant, but also to exchange and sell
certain quantities of seeds for reproductive purposes.
Unlike the 1978 Act, the 1991 version does not authorise farmers to sell or exchange seeds with other
farms for propagating purposes. This limitation has been criticised as inconsistent with traditional and
age-old practices of farmers in many developing and least developed countries, where seeds are
regularly exchanged for purposes of crop and variety rotation13 *E.I.P.R. 169 (crop rotation is
considered a wise practice for many reasons, disease avoidance being a major one). In fact, it is
believed that food security of many local communities in most developing countries depends largely
on their saving, sharing and replanting seeds from the previous harvest (which the 1991 UPOV
Convention either limits or prohibits). Moreover these practices--which take place within the same
community and are co-operative rather than profit-oriented--appear to be essential to preserve the
vitality of the crops across their different generations, and contribute to genetic diversity.14
The TRIPs Agreement
The other international agreement which provides intellectual property protection to plant breeding is
the TRIPs Agreement. This treaty requires all WTO members to introduce at least a minimum level of
protection in their national laws for biotechnological inventions and plant varieties. In particular,
Art.27.3(b) of this treaty provides that (1) certain agro-biotechnological inventions must be considered
patentable, and that (2) “Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents
or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof”.
Patent rights
As is known, patent rights--being IPRs--have the same rationale and purpose as PVP. Whoever
makes a new invention (for example, an agro-biotechnological invention) is given legal protection,
such protection consisting of the possibility for the inventor to prevent others from commercially
exploiting the said new invention. By providing that, the TRIPs Agreement aims to promote the
creation of useful inventions.
In particular, agricultural biotechnology is a technique used by scientists to create, improve or modify
plants (e.g. genetic engineering). Several scientists believe that agricultural biotechnology has great
economic and humanitarian potential. There might be vast benefits: genetically modified seeds
potentially have the ability to combat malnutrition and poverty by creating speciality crops with high
productivity, better nutrition value and enhanced resistance to diseases.15 It is also for these benefits
that the TRIPs Agreement made it compulsory to provide patent protection for such kinds of
inventions.
However, some commentators underline the possible connection between the patent system and a
bias towards centralised agricultural research. They believe, in particular, that patent protection in the
agrobiotech sector enhances incentives to develop seeds with a large potential demand and that--to
ensure maximum demand for their patented products--biotech companies tend to focus their research
on commonly utilised high-value crops and develop varieties that can be cultivated as widely as
possible. Therefore some think that the use of patented agro-biotechnological inventions favours
centralised crop breeding and the creation of uniform environmental conditions, as well as
discouraging agro-ecological research or local breeding tailored to local conditions. The effects of this
patent-supported bias towards centralised crop breeding programmes might be, inter alia, decreased
crop diversity and decreased spatial genetic diversity.16
Plant varieties
As far as plant varieties are concerned, the TRIPs Agreement obliges the WTO Members to provide a
form of protection, giving freedom in choosing the appropriate system. States can choose between
patent protection, a sui generis system or any combination thereof.
It is difficult to precisely identify the sui generis system mentioned by Art.27.3(b) of the TRIPs
Agreement.
On the one hand, some industrialised countries are of the opinion that the sui generis system at issue
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should be the one provided by the UPOV Convention, or at least a UPOV-like one.
On the other hand, many developing countries are convinced that--when implementing such
provision-- states can devise a system different from a UPOV-based one and consequently balance
the interests of plant breeders and society as a whole, including local farmers. In this regard, a good
example is the Indian Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act of 2001, which recognises
at the same time the rights of both breeders and farmers.
Moreover, some propose to design a sui generis system by adding to the DUS requirements an
additional one, i.e. the so-called “value for cultivation and use” requirement (VCU).17 Defining the VCU
requirement would be left to national governments and could be adopted to ensure that breeders
contribute to certain national priorities. For example, for a new variety to acquire protection, VCU
might require applicants to demonstrate the socio-economic welfare or environmental benefits of the
new variety, such as how it might benefit small farmers in terms of enhancing productivity or requiring
fewer external inputs.18
Other critical considerations
The trend towards increasing intellectual property protection in plant breeding and agro-biotechnology
entails other important consequences.
*E.I.P.R. 170 First, private sector research in agriculture has radically increased, driven in part by the
possibilities of profits supported by IPRs, especially PVP and patents. The author notes that in the
past--e.g. when the Green Revolution took place in the 1960s--crop breeding was carried out mainly
by the public sector and especially through public-funded research.
Secondly, the author notes that--also owing to increasing intellectual property protection--the private
sector industry has greatly centralised. What was once an industry in which small seed breeders
played a major role has now become a global oligopoly dominated by few leading multinational
companies. Mergers between agro-biotech companies create even larger firms which together tend to
produce an oligopoly that might allow them greater freedom to fix higher prices and--in
general--induce them to engage in anti-competitive behaviour.
Moreover, IPRs in plant breeding and agro-biotechnology may entail other serious
environmental-related consequences, which might have an impact on sustainability.
For example, it can be noted that seed companies often develop and protect (by either PVP or
patents) hybrids and other modern varieties that depend upon applications of external inputs
produced and sold by the same companies (such as fertilisers, herbicides and insecticides). It is
believed that an excessive use of such agrochemicals--which in some cases turn out to be
toxic--might have serious environmental consequences,19 as well as a strong social and economic
impact, especially in developing countries.20 In particular, these crop-herbicide-pesticide linkages can
be considered to represent a shift towards capitalintensive agriculture that increases the costs of
farming and may therefore be detrimental to small farmers, and runs counter to the goal of
sustainable agriculture.21 Moreover, these linkages can trigger a vicious circle of billionaire profits in
favour of few multinational seed companies and strengthen their (already) dominant positions in
international markets.22
According to some commentators, it is (also) intellectual property protection that induces breeders to
shift to such external inputs (which indeed are often patented) and crop-herbicide-pesticide linkages.
However, such an assertion has been easily confuted.23
Another relevant issue is the one related to the so-called Genetic Use Restriction Technology
(GURT).24 GURT is a technology which renders it feasible to sell biological organisms (such as seeds
and plants) that are unable to be reproduced by the purchaser. In other words, these technologies
render the harvested seed sterile. The purpose of GURT--which has been patented--is to prevent
farmers from replanting saved seed and thereby to consolidate the seed companies' monopoly.25
Moreover, when GURT is applied to IP-protected seeds, it provides a means not only of preventing
the infringement of IPRs and the application of the rules on farmers' exemption, but also of ensuring
the continuation of the monopoly beyond the life of any patent or plant variety certificate. Although
GURT technology is not used on a massive commercial scale yet, some commentators point out that
its possible application might affect the future of agriculture.
Conclusions
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We have seen that IPRs and agriculture--two subjects that once were not so related--are becoming
increasingly intimate bedfellows.
In the last years, international standard-setting activities have begun to extend intellectual property
protection to plant varieties and agro-biotechnological inventions, i.e. to subject-matter which--at least
in many developing and least developed countries--has never been considered protectable through
intellectual property law.
The UPOV Convention and the TRIPs Agreement are the results of the above-mentioned
international standard-setting activities. Moreover, more and more developing and least developed
countries (even the ones which have not adhered to UPOV) are entering into bilateral and regional
free trade agreements with industrialised countries, such as the United States, these *E.I.P.R. 171
agreements binding the said countries either to adhere to UPOV ‘91 or to protect plant varieties
through UPOVstyle rules.
As we have seen, the main purpose of intellectual property systems in crop breeding is stimulating
the creation of new useful plants and crops, which can bring vast benefits to society at large: for
example, genetically modified seeds--with their high productivity and enhanced resistance to
diseases--might be a good response to malnutrition in the poor areas of the world.
However, it is important not to underestimate the social, economical and environmental impact of the
regulation at issue, especially in developing and least developed countries.26 This is particularly true if
we consider that in these states agricultural activities (which--until few years ago and in certain
countries still today--have been carried out mainly by public institutions) are very relevant and socially
sensitive, unlike what happens in industrialised countries, where only 5 per cent of the population is
involved in crop breeding.
The above confirms that it is very important for the said countries to adopt intellectual property
regimes that do not jeopardise the agriculture sector (which still represents their only
development-oriented opportunity) and consequently take into consideration also the interests of
small farmers and local communities (in this regard, the above-mentioned Indian Protection of Plant
Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act of 2001 is a good example).
Moreover, states--in order to avoid the monopolisation of already existing genetic resources--should
not legitimise misinterpretations of the above-mentioned UPOV rule, according to which PVP is
granted also to varieties which are merely discovered and further developed. In addition, in order to
protect farmers' interests, GURT should not be allowed and international treaties should specify and
stress such a ban.
It is also very important to maintain the structure of international agro-industrial markets to be as
competitive as possible, avoiding an exercise of IPRs which entails abusive behaviour and
jeopardises the interest of consumers and farmers.27 In this regard, national and regional antitrust
authorities should intervene in order to prohibit and punish such behaviour. In that way, it is the
author's opinion that there might be more chances to meet the above-mentioned UPOV goals, i.e.
food security and availability, sustainable agriculture and protection of the environment and
biodiversity.
Gianni, Origoni, Grippo & Partners, Milan; Ph.D. candidate in International and EU Law, University of
Florence.
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